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D R A F T 
COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED POLICY GUIDANCE 
ON MINORITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS 
The National Women's Law Center submits these comments on 
behalf of itself and the undersigned organizations regarding the 
Department of Education's proposed policy guidance (PPG) on 
minority scholarship prog~ams. In our view, the proposed policy 
guidance is deeply flawed and should be withdrawn for the 
following reasons. First, in disregarding the pervasive 
discrimination and underrepresentation suffered by racial 
minorities in higher education and focusing solely on the 
politically charged issue of "reverse discrimination," the policy 
misconstrues the history and remedia.l nature of our civil rights 
laws. Second, the policy ignores the very real problem of 
widespread discrimination in college and university scholarship 
programs against women and members of other protected groups. 
Finally, in setting up different rules for scholarship programs 
based on the source of funds within an institution for such 
programs, the policy directly contravenes the clear meaning of 
the Civil Rights Restoration Act and other principles of 
coverage, thereby laying the groundwork for the wholesale 
violation of the civil rights laws at issue. 
Our interest as women's groups in this question is based on 
three concerns. First, we are deeply committed to the 
eradication of all forms of discrimination and its effects, very 
much including discrimination against racial minorities in higher 
education. Because targeted scholarship programs have been an 
effective tool to combat the tragic history of racial 
discrimination in this country and to enhance the access of 
racial minorities to higher education, we strongly support their 
continuation. The dual discrimination faced by women of color 
underscores our concern as well as the importance of the 
principles at stake. Second, many of the issues raised in the 
PPG including the place of affirmative action in education, and 
the misconstruction of the civil Rights Restoration Act and other 
coverage principles such as "significant assistance," will 
directly and deleteriously affect women's access to higher 
education and to education in general. This is because Title IX, 
the principal federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in 
education, is modeled on and construed similarly to Title VI 
which is the legal basis for the PPG. Finally, the proposed 
policy's total disregard of the serious discrimination against 
women in scholarship programs is both inexplicable and 
inexcusable. For all of these reasons, we urge the Department to 
withdraw the proposed policy guidance and to address the real 
problems of discrimination in higher education. 
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I. The Civil Rights Laws Permit Education Institutions To Take 
Voluntary. Affirmative Steps To Address The Underrepresentation 
Of Protected Groups Without Requiring An Adjudication Of 
Discrimination 
In prohibiting voluntary race targeted affirmative action 
scholarship programs, and limiting race targeted programs to 
situations where there have been actual findings of 
discrimination, the proposed policy guidance disregards the broad 
remedial purposes underlying the civil rights acts within its 
jurisdiction, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Age Discrimination Act ("civil rights 
acts''). Indeed, the Department's own regulations specifically 
authorize both remedial and affirmative action programs under 
these statutes. See, ~' 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (b) (6) (Title VI); 
34 C.F.R. § 106.3 (Title IX). Under both regulatory schemes 
recipients are specifically authorized, "in the absence of a 
finding of discrimination" to "take affirmative action to 
overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limited 
participation ... by persons of a ... "particular sex, race, 
color or national origin. Id. 
While the PPG acknowledges the regulation, it interprets it 
to prohibit scholarship programs specifically targeted to address 
the underrepresentation of members of the very groups protected 
by the statutes. Instead it would permit only those scholarship 
programs which enhance "diversity" within the university, with 
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diversity used in the most general sense of the term. This 
interpretation, which is accompanied by no analysis, would turn 
the civil rights acts which were enacted to prohibit and redress 
specific forms of pernicious discrimination into general, nearly 
meaningless statements of support for the proposition that 
universities benefit from having a broad range of students. That 
range, as contemplated by the PPG, includes minorities and women, 
to be sure, but it also includes oboe players and students from 
England. This reading of 'Title VI is simply not supportable. 
Moreover, it raises grave questions about the continued 
vitality of any regulatory principle of affirmative action in 
education. As such, it has a chilling and deleterious effect, 
not only on scholarship programs but on other exceedingly 
important affirmative action programs designed to bring 
minorities and women into disciplines in which they have been 
historically underrepresented. These include, for example, 
programs to enhance the participation of girls and women in the 
study of math, science and computer technologies. 
Contrary to the position of the PPG, the principle of 
voluntary, targeted affirmative action which is enunciated in 
both the Title VI and Title IX regulations is well-grounded in 
governing law. We incorporate by reference the excellent 
discussion in the Statement of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. Opposing the Position of the Office of 
Civil Rights On Minority Targeted Scholarships submitted in 
response to the Department's May 30, 1991 request for comments 
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\ ., 
regarding the proper analysis of affirmative action to address 
racial discrimination and underrepresentation. Notwithstanding 
the recent decision in Podberesky v. Kirwan, No. 91-2577 (4th 
Cir. January 31, 1992), which will almost surely be appealed, we 
believe that the NAACP LDF position is the correct one which will 
ultimately be adopted by the courts. 
We will take this ·opportunity to set out the legal authority 
. 
for affirmative action to address inequities facing women and 
girls. The Supreme Court laid out the framework for this 
analysis in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718 (1982) where it addressed the question of whether Mississippi 
could provide an all women's nursing school as part of its system 
of higher education. The Court held that, because nursing was a 
traditionally female occupation which was dominated by women, the 
exclusion of males constituted a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, the Court was careful to note that: 
In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification 
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally 
and directly assists members of the sex that is 
disproportionately burdened. 
Id. at 728. Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized that 
providing benefits to women, but not to men, is permissible in 
order to achieve a compensatory purpose. See, ~, Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (statutory classification which 
allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years than men in 
computation of Social Security benefits upheld because of 
workplace inequities); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
(1975) (federal statute providing more time to female Naval 
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officers than to male Naval officers for promotion before 
mandatory discharge permissible based on limitations on females' 
service opportunities); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 
(1974) (upholding property tax exemption for widows but not 
widowers to cushion disproportionately heavy economic impact of 
spousal loss). See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 
U.S. 616 (1987). In none of these cases was there an actual 
finding of discrimination; rather, the Court based its decisions 
on the view that distinctions favoring women were permissibly 
based on societal discrimination and/or underrepresentation. 
The record is clear that there are serious problems of 
underrepresentation of racial minorities in higher education 
generally, to say nothing of the extreme history of racial 
discrimination in this country. Moreover, women are the victims 
of both historic discrimination and severe underrepresentation in 
a variety of disciplines including, for example, math, science, 
engineering and other technical areas. Targeted scholarship --
and other -- programs designed to redress this discrimination and 
expand opportunities are in full compliance with the governing 
law and should be permitted. 
II. The Proposed Policy Guidance Inexplicably And 
Inexcusably Ignores The Serious Problem Of Discrimination Against 
Women In Scholarship Programs 
The proposed policy guidance raises the question of whether 
it is a violation of the civil rights laws to target scholarship 
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resources to members of certain protected groups, particularly 
racial minorities. However, it inexplicably ignores the very 
real problem of scholarship discrimination against members of 
protected groups, including women and minorities, and in favor of 
whites and males. We find the Department's decision to devote 
its first major statement in many years on the subject of 
scholarship discrimination to "reverse discrimination .. to 
represent a fundamentally wrong-headed policy. We urge the 
Department to re-examine its priorities and to put its resources 
into eradicating discrimination against those for whom the 
statutes were passed, and for whom the discrimination and the 
ensuing burdens have long been documented but remain unremedied. 
While in this discussion we are focusing on sex-
discrimination, it is equally important for the Department to 
address discrimination against members of protected groups on the 
basis of race and national origin under Title VI, disability 
under Section 504, and age under the Age Discrimination Act. The 
enforcement of all of these statutes is squarely within the 
Department's jurisdiction. Yet, despite its clear-cut and long-
standing statutory obligations, the Department has largely 
ignored discrimination in scholarship programs across-the-board. 
Scholarship discrimination against women takes a variety of 
forms. To begin with, it includes scholarship programs which, on 
their face, favor men. Title IX regulations permit scholarship 
programs 
established pursuant to domestic or foreign wills, 
trusts, bequests, or similar legal instruments or by 
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acts of a foreign government which require[) that 
awards be made to members of a particular sex specified 
therein; Provided, That the overall effect of the award 
of such sex-restricted scholarships, fellowships, and 
other forms of financial assistance does not 
discriminate on the basis of sex. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.37(b). 
As originally proposed, the exception would have applied 
only to financial aid "established under a foreign will, trust, 
bequest, or similar legal instrument, or by a foreign 
government." Proposed re~ulation § 86.35, 39 Fed. Reg. 22236 
(June 20, 1974). According to the materials accompanying the 
final regulation, the change in the rule which was eventually 
promulgated was based 'on comments from "colleges and universities 
claiming [that the stricter rule against sex-based scholarships 
which had originally been proposed] would cause to 'dry-up' a 
substantial portion of funds currently available for student 
financial assistance made available through wills, trusts and 
bequests which require that award be made to members of a 
specified sex." Preamble to the Title IX Regulations, Federal 
Register, June 4, 1975, Reprinted in Sex Discrimination 
Regulations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary 
Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975) at 19. No facts or 
evidence were cited to support the claim that scholarship 
assistance would "dry Up" if the original regulation were 
promulgated and, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
inquiry into this question since 1975. 
In any event, regardless of the reasons underlying the 
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promulgation of this regulation over fifteen years ago, there is 
absolutely no justification for the continued regulatory approval 
of facially sex-discriminatory scholarships. We urge the 
Department to demonstrate that it is serious about ending 
scholarship discrimination by withdrawing this regulation. For 
the reasons discussed above, the only permissible sex-designated 
scholarships are those which evince a compensatory purpose. Such 
a purpose could include, for example, expanding opportunities for 
women to pursue studies in areas such as math, science, 
engineering, computer and other technical programs in which they 
have been historically underrepresented. It most assuredly does 
not include honoring the discriminatory whim of a donor. 
The problems underlying this regulation are only compounded 
by the Department's lack of enforcement of the proviso. To the 
best of our knowledge, the Department has never investigated, let 
alone enforced or provided policy guidance regarding, the 
requirement that t,he "overall effect" of. sex-specific 
scholarships be non-discriminatory. There is no hard data 
regarding the extent of sex-specific scholarship programs 
although anecdotal evidence strongly suggests, as one would 
expect, that these programs tilt heavily in favor of males. The 
lack of enforcement of the proviso also strongly counsels against 
extending this "principle" to the question of minority 
scholarships. There is no reason to believe that the Department 
would -- or could -- assure that "overall equity" is achieved in 
scholarships on the basis of race any more effectively than it 
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has done on the basis of sex. To the contrary, fifteen years of 
experience demonstrates that the concept is essentially 
meaningless and unenforceable. 
A second example of blatant scholarship discrimination 
against women, and one which costs women at least tens of 
millions of dollars every year, is discrimination in athletic 
scholarship programs. Athletic scholarships are allocated and 
awarded on the explicit basis of sex. While, again, data is 
incomplete regarding the actual allocation of athletic 
scholarship dollars, available evidence confirms that the lion's 
share of these scholarship dollars are reserved for men only. 
NCAA statistics confirm that women get barely a quarter of these 
valuable scholarship dollars. (Raiborn, 1990 at 37). 
current Title IX regulations simply state that athletic aid 
should be awarded "in proportion to the number of students of 
each sex participating in ... intercollegiate athletics.'' 34 
C.F.Ro § 106.36 (c). Despite repeated requests from groups 
including the National Women's Law Center and the National 
Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, and despite a number 
of administrative complaints which have been filed with the 
Office for civil Rights which have raised the issue of sex 
discrimination in the allocation of athletic scholarships, the 
Department has failed to take steps to combat this very serious 
problem. 
For example, it has refused to include discrimination 
against women in the allocation of participation opportunities 
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or even meaningfully address participation discrimination which 
has kept women at approximately 30% of college athletes for well 
over ten years in the analysis of scholarship discrimination. 
This is in spite of the fact that given the linkage in the 
regulation between participation and scholarship aid, addressing 
discrimination in participation is absolutely crucial. It is 
also in spite of the fact that the one court to have addressed 
the issue specifically held that discrimination in allocating 
participation opportunities could not be used to justify 
scholarship discrimination. Haffer v. Temple University, 678 F. 
Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In addition, the Department has 
persisted in adhering to a highly technical statistical analysis 
of "proportionality" which has the effect of permitting a college 
or university to grant a substantially higher proportion of aid 
to its male athletes than would be justified by a strict 
numerical application of the proportionality standard. 
If the Department is serious about ending scholarship 
discrimination, the practice of earmarking ·approximately three-
quarters of all athletic scholarship dollars for men only must be 
at the very top of the list. At the same time, because of the 
historic and pervasive discrimination against women in 
intercollegiate athletics, the Department must take compensatory 
steps to assure that female athletes receive a fair share of 
these dollars. It would be a blatant violation of Title IX to 
allow institutions of higher education to adopt so-called sex 
neutral criteria to keep in place a system which has 
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systematically and very effectively denied women anything 
resembling fair and equal treatment. 
A final category of sex-based scholarship inequities stem 
from scholarship practices which, unlike those just discussed, 
are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on the basis of 
sex. Such "disparate impact" discrimination is clearly 
prohibited by the civil rights laws, including Title IX. The 
Supreme Court first addressed the question in Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Service Comm•n., 46~ U.S. 582 (1983) where a majority held 
that Title VI's regulations properly prohibit practices which 
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race or 
national origin. The Court unanimously reaffirmed this holding 
several years later in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 
(1985). A majority of the circuits have since explicitly 
recognized that a cause of action premised on the Title VI 
regulations properly extends to disparate impact discrimination. 
See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th cir. 
1984); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing, 799 
F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); Craft v. Board of Trustees of 
University of Illinois, 793 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986). 
Title IX was expressly modeled on Title VI and is construed 
accordingly. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695-
96 (1979). Title IX cases have followed Guardians and have 
confirmed that Title IX also reaches disparate impact 
discrimination. Indeed, two of the leading Title IX cases have 
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specifically addressed sex discrimination in the award of 
scholarships. Most recently, in Sharif v. New York State 
Department of Education, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) Judge 
Walker applied a disparate impact analysis to find that New 
York's use of SAT scores to award state scholarships, which 
resulted in a disparate impact against young women, constituted a 
violation of Title IX. Similarly, in Haffer v. Temple 
University, 678 F. Supp. at 539-40 the court held that plaintiffs 
did not have to show an intent to discriminate in order to 
succeed on their claims of sex discrimination in the granting of 
scholarships in Temple University's intercollegiate athletic 
program. 
While there is ample evidence of disparate impact 
discrimination in the award of scholarships and financial aid, 
the Department has failed to take any steps whatsoever to address 
-- or even acknowledge -- the problem. The inquiry starts very 
close to home within the financial aid programs administered by 
the Department of Education itself. According to the just 
published Fact Book On Women In Higher Education, American 
Council On Education (1991), 
[i)n all categories in which aid was awarded in fall 
1986, women received on average fewer dollars than men. 
The greatest discrepancy was in federal work-study 
awards, where men received an average of 134% of what 
women received ($1,621 for men compared to $1,211 for 
women). 
Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, while male and female undergraduates received 
about the same average amount in federal grants, "the average 
13 
nonf ederal grant for a man was 11% higher than for a woman 
($2,046 compared to $1,848). Id. As a result, "[i]n fall 1986, 
an undergraduate man received an average of 7% more in total 
financial aid than an undergraduate woman ($3,996 compared to 
$3, 740)." Id. 
Sex-based differences in financial assistance persist for 
students pursuing doctoral studies. According to the American 
Council on Education, "[f]rom 1978 on, a higher proportion of 
women than men [has] used.their own earnings, spouse's earnings, 
family contributions, and borrowings to support doctoral 
studies." Id. at 114. The statistics demonstrate that women are 
disproportionately consigned to the least advantageous mechanisms 
for financing their doctoral studies. For example, twenty-seven 
percent of women took out Guaranteed Student Loans as compared to 
only twenty-one percent of men. Id. Men, on the other hand, 
disproportionately profit from the more prestigious and 
advantageous financing mechanisms: 
[t]he greatest overall discrepancy between women and 
men in sources of support for doctoral studies between 
1974 and 1987 occurred in the awarding of research 
assistantships. In 1974, women received 12% fewer of 
these awards than men; in 1985, they received 15% 
fewer; and in 1987, 10% fewer. 
To the best of our knowledge, the Department has never even 
looked into the facts underlying these extremely troubling 
statistics to determine whether discrimination is present. 
Other scholarship programs which have a clear-cut disparate 
impact on the basis of sex include programs which award 
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scholarships based on standardized test scores. A prime example 
is the National Merit Scholarship program which uses the 
Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test as the sole criterion for 
determining its semi-finalist pool from which all scholarship 
winners are selected. Year-in and year-out, between 60% and 66% 
of these prestigious scholarships -- totalling over $23 million 
annually -- are awarded to young men. (Rosser, The SAT Gender 
Gap: Identifying the Causes (1989) at 85). Other scholarship 
programs based on PSAT or SAT scores include, for example, 
scholarships awarded by the states of New York, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nevada and Rhode Island. Despite the fact that 
the only court to address the issue found that the use of SAT 
scores to award scholarships constitutes sex discrimination in 
violation of Title IX, Sharif v. New York State Department of 
Education, 709 F. Supp. at 345, the Department of Education has 
taken no steps whatsoever to address this problem. 
In sum, the record is clear that there are serious problems 
of sex discrimination in the award of scholarships in higher 
education. The record is also clear that the Department of 
Education has done virtually nothing to address this 
discrimination. We find the Department's total disregard of sex 
discrimination in the award of scholarships and financial aid --
at the same time that it has chosen to expend substantial 
resources on the issue of reverse discrimination in 
scholarships -- to be both inexcusable and inexplicable. 
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III. The Proposed Policy Guidance Fails As A Matter Of Law 
As It Incorrectly Interprets Both The Civil Rights Restoration 
Act And The Principle of Significant Assistance 
Finally, the proposed policy guidance seriously misconstrues 
two key aspects of the governing law as it seeks to carve out an 
exception to permit colleges to "administer private donor race-
exclusive scholarships (a scholarship where the private donor 
restricts eligibility to students of designated races or national 
origins) where that aid does not limit the amount, type or terms 
of financial aid available to any student." The proposed 
distinction between "private donor race exclusive scholarships" 
which are "administered" by the institution and scholarships 
which are funded by the institution -- which is presented without 
explanation or legal justification -- is in direct contravention 
of both the Civil Rights Restoration Act (CRRA) passed by 
Congress in 1988 and the well-established principle that 
recipients may not circumvent the civil rights laws by extending 
significant assistance to an entity which discriminates. 
A. The Civil Rights Restoration Act 
Congress passed the CRRA to reverse the Supreme Court's 
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) which 
held that the civil rights acts' prohibitions against 
discrimination applied only to the particular programs and 
activities funded by federal dollars. The CRRA clarified that 
these laws prohibit discrimination in all activities of an 
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education institution which receives any federal funds, whether 
or not such funds flow to the particular activity at issue. It 
states in pertinent part: 
For the purposes of this title, the term "program or 
activity" and "program" mean all of the operations of-
* * * (2) (A) A college, university, or other post-secondary 
institution, or a public system of higher education; 
(emphasis added). 
Congress' intent in framing this language is crystal clear. 
As the Senate Report explains: 
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amends each of 
the affected statutes by adding a sectio~ defining the 
phrase "program or activity" and "program" to make 
clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout 
entire agencies or institutions if any part receives 
Federal financial assistance. . . . For education 
institutions, the bill provides that where federal aid 
is extended anywhere within a college, university, or 
public system of higher education, the entire 
institution or system is covered. 
Sen. Rep. No. 100-64, lOOth Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) at 4 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, if it is a violation of the civil rights 
acts for a recipient institution to fund a race exclusive 
scholarship with its own funds, it necessarily follows that it is 
a violation of these laws to fund such a scholarship with private 
funds. 
While the Department's effort to insulate "private donor" 
funds from its ban on race specific scholarships may serve the 
short-term purpose of preserving at least some of these 
scholarships, it has a long-term deleterious effect on the 
enforcement of the civil rights acts. This is based on the fact 
that by excluding "private donor funds" which are nonetheless 
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"administered" by the institution from the requirements of those 
laws, it creates a blueprint for avoiding the clear statutory 
prohibitions against discrimination in the four statutes at 
issue. If all an institution has to do to circumvent the divil 
rights laws is to obtain private funding for an activity in which 
it seeks to discriminate, w~ are returned to a reading of those 
laws which is even more restrictive and contrary to congressional 
intent than that encompassed i? the discredited Grove City 
College decision. Indeed, in Grove-. city Colleg.e itself, the 
Court held that· the entire scholarship program was covered 
because of the government-funded scholarships which its students 
received. 
Accordingly, we must vigorously pr9test the Department's 
theory for preserving some racially-targeted scholarships over 
the short-term but which will fundamentally undermine the 
enforcement of the civil righ~s taw·s over the .lc>ng-term. The 
Department has no authority to differentiate between an 
institution's civil rights obligations based on the source of 
funds at issue. We respectfully request·that it comply with the 
clear meaning of the Civil Rights Restoration Act. 
B. Significant Assistance 
·The related. concept .of .-"significant assist~nce 1 ' is -also 
implicated by the PPG's endorsement ·of an instit'ution's ability 
to administer "private" race exclusive scholarship funds. The 
significant assistance principle bars institutions from engaging 
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in "shell games" to shift discriminatory activities to entities 
not themselves covered under the civil rights acts, and thereby 
shield the institution's dirty business of discrimination. While 
the short-term purpose of the exception in the PPG for private 
donor funds may appear attractive in that it permits private 
donors to designate scholarship funds in a race exclusive manner, 
in the long-term it fundamentally undermines the broader, very 
important principle. 
. 
Under the Title IX regulations recipients are prohibited 
from "providing significant assistance to any agency, 
organization or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in 
providing any aid, benefit, or service to students or employees." 
34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (6). In the leading litigation regarding 
this regulation, the former fifth circuit interpreted it broadly 
to bar a University from having any relation with an honor 
society which admitted men only. Iron Arrow Honor Society v. 
Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983), dismissed as moot, 464 
U.S. 67 {1983). 
Title IX's financial aid regulations are even more specific. 
They prohibit a recipient from: "through solicitation, listing, 
approval, provision of facilities or other services, assist any 
foundation, trust, agency, organization~ or person which provides 
assistance to any of such recipient's students in a manner which 
discriminates on the basis of sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(a) (2). See 
also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (b) (4) (under Title VI prohibited 
discrimination in financial aid includes "benefits provided in or 
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through a facility provided with the aid of Federal financial 
assistance.") (emphasis added). 
If an institution's administration of private donor 
restricted scholarships does not constitute significant 
assistance within the meaning of these regulations, there is 
nothing at all left to the principle. By so weakening the 
concept of significant assistance, the Department is, in effect, 
providing institutions with a blueprint of how to circumvent anti-
discrimination requirements. There is no analytical difference 
between the practices authorized by the PPG in this regard and 
institutions which, for example, set up and expand "private" 
booster clubs to fund men's athletics programs but not women's, 
reinstitute all-male honor societies which are nominally run by 
their alumni and not the institution, and "contract out" the 
operation of housing facilities to permit superior accommodations 
to continue to be offered to young men. 
We urge the Department to reject out of hand this approach and 
retain the broad prohibition of discrimination which is properly 
based in current law. 
Conclusion 
For the above stated reasons, we urge the Department not to 
promulgate the PPG as a final regulation. Instead, the Department 
should reinforce the longstanding principle that recipients are 
permitted to take race, sex, national origin, age and disability 
into account in order to address the underrepresentation of 
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protected groups in the academic community as well as historic 
discrimination against members of these groups. Moreover, the 
Department should devote its resources to eradicating the very real 
discrimination which continues to keep women and minorities from 
full and equal participation in academia. 
RS C: \wpdir\ejv\scholar .min: Febnwy 7, 1992 
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